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Abstract 
Who Receives Medical Care? Income, Implicit Prices and the Distribution 
of Medical Services Among Pregnant Women in the United States 
We examine in this paper how medical treatments are distributed·among 
pregnant women in the United States in 1980, according to both their initial 
health and their economic resources. Different implicit pricing.regimes for 
allocating medical services are modeled and their implications for the 
distribution of services elaborated. We found that (i) more-educated women and 
women with husbands having higher incomes receive a disproportionate share of 
the four major treatments studied; (ii) prenatal treatments are more likely to 
be provided to less-healthy infants (mothers) within schooling and income 
groups; and (iii) treatment differentials by education and income are increased 
by controlling for behavior that affects the pre-treatment healthiness of the 
infant ... · The ,.results .. are .consistent with the existence of a market regime for.. 
medical care that allocates health treatments to those who demand them, whether 
the demand is due .to superior knowledge of the benefits of health, greater 
resources, or preferences. Mothers of healthier infants are more likely to 
postpone seeing a doctor; visit a doctor less often, and are less likely to 
receive treatments while pregnant. This compensatory allocation of medical 
services, combined with the inability of.the researcher to measure directly all 
contributions to. pre-.treatment health, can lead to erroneous .inferences 
concerning the efficacy of the treatments. Controlling for initial health 
status is shown to significantly change measures of the therapeutic benefits of 
medically-administered treatments in the US health care system. 
It is now a well-e&tabliahed fact thct high-income and highly-edu~t$d 
per&ons in the United State& ~re healthier than their poorer end le&a-oducated 
counterparto <Taubaan and Rosen, 1982; Fucha, 1985>. In part becauaa of concern 
&bout inco&e disparities in health, public resources have been allocated to 
subsidize medical care to vulnerable, poor populations in the United Stetes 
(Coraan and Gt·ossaan, 1985). For exa~ple, the Medicaid program, enacted in 1965, 
finances Medical service& for poor faailiea who are eligible for Aid to Faailiea 
with Dependent Children. Medicare provides siailar subsidies to the old; 
6aendaents to Title V of the Social Security Act of 1963 authorize federal 
grants to facilitate the provision of prenatal and obstetrical care to low-
. incoae populations in "aedically underserved" localities, and the Woaen. Infants 
and Children CWIC> prograa, begun in 1983, provides grants to local agencies for 
the provision of food supple:aents to pregnant and lactating woaen. 
Coexisting with thase federal health subsidies directed to low-inco11e 
9roups the federal tax code per11its ~edical expenditures to be deducted fro• 
gross taxble incoas (though restrictions have tightened over the years>. This 
"tax subsidization" (Pauly, 1986> of aedical care clearly benefits Most persona 
with high incomes confronting high Marginal tax rates. The pervasiveness of 
untaxed health benefit's in co•pensation packages of full-the workers is yet 
another way tax policy subsidizes health care for selected groups. It is thus 
unclear what the ntlt distributional consequenceG are o:f these varied ·inter­
ventions in health care pricing. 
Despite conce~n about inequities in health care, little is known about the 
distribution of tht1 actual use of aedical services across groups defined by 
incoae, education, r~ce, or initial health, or whether inequalities in the 
after-tax pricing of ~edical care aitigate or exacerbate health differentials. 
Indeed, in on environ~ent in which health is c noraal consuMer good and ia 
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i_nf luenced in part by the behavior of consu111er.s <consuieption of health-related 
goocl.s>, and aedical aervicea <"treat.aenta'") ore aubetitutea for auch health­
related gooda, it is not obvious that those with higher-incose=;will conauae aore 
treataent& even under a regiae in which the iMplicit price& of aedical 
treataenta ars not affected by incoae. It is tberefora not poaaible to infer 
froa only the di&tribution of aedical services used by incoae clas& or by race 
whether agent& face different iaplicit prices for auch service&. ftoreover, a 
regiae in which treat•ent& are co~pleaentary to health-related goods could not 
be distinguished fro■ a regiae in which high-incoae agents (conau•era/producera 
of health> pay lower prices (net of taxes> for treataents. 
Tcble 1 presents si~ple statistics on the incidence of four coaaon 
treatEtents provided to pregncnt woaen ccro&s race, incoiR~..and education classes, 
based on a probability saaple of all women havin~ a legitiaate live birth in 
1980 in the United States. Among these woaen of aiailar. but by no aeana 
identical, pre-treataent health statue, there are soae striking differences in 
treatMent incidence. For exaMple, Black mothers were 40 percent less likely to 
have received an x-ray than White aothers but were claost 20 percent aore likely 
to have received a caesarean section; aaniocentesis was 50 percent lea& likely, 
x-rays 26 percent less likely and ccesarean section 24 percent less likely to 
have been provided to aothers whose husbands earned lee& than $6000 in 1979 
coapared to aotheru whose husbands inco•e was at least 630000. Mothers with at 
least so•e college-level schooling, aoreover, were alao&t twice as likely as 
aothers with lesa than nine years of schooling to have received en x-roy while 
pregnant. 
The inequities in aedical treataenta received by aocioeconoaic groups 
indicated in Table 1 do not i•ply that the less-healthy receive fewer 
treat•ents; it is possible that goods deleterious to (infent) health have 
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Toble 1 
Percent of Pregnant Wolilen Receiving Selected Medical Service&, by Type of 
Treataent, and by Race, Schooling of Mother end Husband's Incoae in 1980 
Treataent 
Caesarean 
Population /umiocentesi& Ultrasound X-Ray Section 
White 4.4 41.4 16.9 17.0 
IHsck 4.9 40.8 10.0 21.1 
Husband'& Incoae 
f6000 (S) 3.5 42.1 13.1 14.4 
6000-15000 4.1 41.0 15.5 17.1 
15000-21000 4.1 41.7 17.5 18.2 
21000-30000 5.4 40.9 18.0 17.8 
isoooo 7.0. 43.2 17.7 19.0 
Mother's Schooling 
iS years 6.3 35.2 9.9 16.2 
9-11 years 4.7 38.8 13.4 15.4 
12 years 3.7 42,1 15.2 16.5 
~13 years 4.9 42.2 19.2 18.9 
Source: 1980 National Natality Followback Survey. 
greater incoae elasticities, or health-augMenting goods have lower incoae 
· elaaticitiea than does health. For exoaple, highly-educated aothera aay 
postpone birth& relative to le&a-educated aothers, which aay be potentially 
horaful to infant health, requiring aore careful aonitoring and treataenta. In 
the absence of inforaation on pre-treataent health etatua it ia thus difficult 
to evaluate how fornal aedical services are distributed across agents. 
In this pcper6 we examine how aediccl treat•ent& a&&ociated with care 
during pregnancy are distributed in the United States within and aero&• pre­
treataent health groups. The existence of a probe.bility aaaple of pregnant 
wo111en (births> affords a special opportunity to study one group that is 
.relatively ho~ogeneous, but not identical, in health &tatus for whoM the 
.relevant aedical treetaenta are relatively a11all in nuaber end.whose relevant 
health-related behavior i& also well··docu11ented.1 Moreover, 11edical care 
provided to expectant mothers ia i11portant since it is care supplied 
si•ultaneously to two generations. 
In section 1, we show that it ia possible to distinguish health care 
regill!e& characterized, by di&tributiva QY,!., pricing aechani6M& (price6, sub&idie&., 
rationing> with knowl9dge of the technology of pre- and poet-treataent health 
production, and by co•paring the overall distribution of treat~ents to 
individuals by their sociosconouic characteristics with the distribution within 
groups defined by their pre-treataent health stat~s. In section 2, we report 
estimates of how consu11ption decisions by the 11othera interact with the 111edical 
procedures to affect one salient health outco•e anasure, birthweight. In 
&action 3. reduced-for• and conditional Con pre-treataent health> treataent 
equations are estiaated to assess the effects of pre-treataent health status and 
&ocioeconoaic characteristics of pregnant wo•en on the probability of their 
receiving each of the four aedical treat~ents. Our result& indicate (i) that 
3 
the efficecy of the treataents var!•• according to the condition• o~ the birth 
that aro aaaocieted with pre-treet~ent choice. aad• by woaenJ <ii> thet theae 
pre-treataent condi tiona vary aignificantly with inco1ue. education, ,end rece: 
(iii) that treatment• are aore likely to be providGd to th• leaa-healthy birtha 
<•others>, but, (iv> that disparitiea in the incidenc• of treataents by inco••• 
educction end race aaong woaen with otherviae id~ntical birth characteriatica, 
i.e., pre-treatMent health, are greater than such disparities not conditioned 
on birth characteri8tics. Thia neans that the lower incidence of treat■enta 
a111on9 poor, less-educated •others, evident in Table l understate& the inequalfty 
·in treehent incidence when differences in pre-treataent heal th conditions, a1·e 
·· taken into account. However• we show that this differential between within-
health atatus group inequalities and the inequalities unconditioned on health 
status does not lend support to the hypothesis the.t the iaplicit price of 
aedicul care ia lower for the higher-incoae groupeo On the other hand, we find 
that Black aother& with otherwise identical, health-relevant birth charac­
teriatica, inco•e• ffnd education are significantly leas likely to receive two of 
the four treataent& in Tt!ble 1: neither socioecono:llic status nor differences in 
birth characteristics can account for these racial disparities. 
1. The De~and for Health and tbs De»and for Medical Care 
To depict usefully the interrelationships betueen the behavior of agent. 
who are heterogeneous in health, their use of medical service&, and the health 
care "delivery &yat:7a.- it ia iaportant to distinguish two types of health 
input&--prascribed ~edical inputs provided by aedical practitioner& 
(utreataents"> and other goods consumed by agents that affect health but which 
ol&oyield utility directly. To highlight thi&. as&ulle that health i& produced 
in a two-stage process. In the first st.a9e, an agent i's pre-treataent health 
hi is a function of hia own consuMption of good Xi and an exogenous endowment 
l-1, auch that 
(1) 
We will a&&Wle that X ia a healthy good, auch that hJ > 0 <and h,:, < .O) for J • 
1,2, although the analyaia could be •Y••etrically couched in teraa of X being 
bad for be~lth <but contributing directly to utility>. 
In the •econd atage. finol heGlth Hi i& influ•n~ed by aedicGl treataent.a 
received ti aa wall as pre-trsataent health status. 
i 1 i i 2 i . i(2) H = H{t ,h) = H(t ,X ,µ) 
. where HJ > o,. J a 1,2. Wa will assune that the t:reataenta are ;uieliorative, 
&ub&titut.es for. the X-good, $0 that :a12 < o. but it i& only i11portant that ths 
efficacy of the treatiaent depend on pre-treataent health or X. 
Agent i aaxiaize& hi& utility, given.by 
(3) 
where UJ > 0, J., l,2f3, and Z is a non-health good, &ubJect to a budget. 
constraint: 
(4) 
where ri i& 09ant i'& incoae. pz and Px are price& of X and z. respectively, 
G&&uaed to be the &aDe aero&& all agent&, Pt<Fi) ia the price per treataent, 
which aay be a function of incoae, and c is a f!~ad (capitation) fee. di&cu&&ed 
below. 
Wa J\ay di&tingu!sh three aedical care regilles u&ing (4). In the firat, 
"noraal ~arket" regiae CI>. traatMents are suppli-d as in an ordinary aarket uo 
that Pt' : 0 and c., O: all agent& pay for each trectPent they receive <"fee-
s 
for-eervice•> and fcce the aaae treat~ent price. In e aubuidized fee-for­
aervico regiMe (II>, iaplicit treatment prices vary with inco••• For oxaaple, 
with a progressive incoae tax end health care deductibility, Pt' < O. Both 
regiaea I and II are characterized by conauaer sovoreignty--private agents 
conauae treataenta baaed on their knowledge of tr•ataent efficacy, froa (2), and 
their preferences aubJect to <4>. The aedical provider'• (doctor's) roles a.re 
to C>upply inforMation on treataent efficacy and to supply (apply> the trsataent 
if it ia wanted by the agent.2 
A third regime <III> <co•pulsory health insu~ance) ccn b~ characterized~• 
Pt• 0 "1hile c > O; aedical treataanta are ..free .. ; agents pay o ~ixed fee 
independent of the treataenta they receive. In thia lest regiae, it ia 
nece&&ary to &pecify the allocation.rule for tre~taenta, given th• 6b5ence of a 
direct price and cona:u11er sovereignty. For exaaple, the allocation rulo aay be 
dete~•ined froa the ~axi~ization of health value-added across agents, i.e., 
(5) 
&ub3ect to a global ~esource constraint T ~ Etp , whera p ia the re&ourc. coat 
per treatment. However the rule& 6ro established, the doctor priaarily aake& 
the decision concerning the distribution of treateenta. 
It i& possible to consider a fourth regiRA in which agent& can pay 
different fixed fee& ci for different health plan& that entitle tbea to a fix~d 
schedule of treat•enta depending on pre-treataent health. In that regi••• 
overage levels of treat•enta would differ across agenta paying different 
capitation fee& but not within fee groups. The~ is, within fee-group&, doctor& 
deter:llline the allocation of treatMenta. However. this re9i11e ia ahlilar to and 
indistinguishable fro~ the first two regiMe& in ter•s of its iaplications for 
the relationship between incoae end treatsentsa since agents still choose the 
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(average> level of treataenta they want by selecting a different plan, at a 
different cost--all agent.a aay face the aaae fee schedule or agent.a aay face 
different iaplicit fee &chedulea if there ere incoae-roloted auba!di••• 
We un the aodel to consider three queationa. Firat, what ia the 
relationship between pre-treataent health and treatae?t• under th• thrse 
regiae&, i.e., ia the allocation of treatmont& by health atatua aaong people 
vith identical incoaes different acroae regiaea? Second, what ia the 
r•lationship between incoae and health treatments under each regiae, and-third, 
how doe& the regise affect the distribution of trGat•onts by inco•e aao09 people 
of the sa11e pre-treat111ent health &tatu& co1tpared to the distribution by in,coae 
acrosa all people. More for11ally, the question& can be poaed in teras of the 
regi~e-spscific prc,pertiea of the reduced-fora and conditional. (on X> demand 
equations fo:r treataenta. These are derived fro• the aodel and are given by (6) 
and <7>, 
(6) 
i* i i Fi)
(7) t = t*(X ,µ, p , pt,
2 
The conditional denand equation <7> describes the outcoae of an experiaent 
•in which each egent. is assigned a fixed level of X but can freely choo&e the 
non-health good z and obtains treataents according to the prevailing health c~re 
regiae. If xi is fixed at the level the agent would otherwi&e have cho&en in 
the absence of quar.tity constraint&, we can eaploy the theory of rationing 
<Houthakker and Tobin, 1950> to ascertain tba effects on the levd of treataeri"t.s 
received of a change in pre-treataent health status. or xi and µ, and of 
variations in incoaa for given pre-treat11ent health status. 
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Coneider firat how treataente vary with "exo9enoua• varietione in pr•­
troctaent. input.a and t.he endowaent within on inco•• group. In the at.andord 
aerket regiae <I> or in e regiao with fee aubeidi•• but agent aovereignty <II>, 
thio 1• aiaply 
(8) 
where the •iJ ere the Hicks coapenaated substitution effects for good i with 
respect to the price of 900d J• When treatments and the health-related good X 
ere aubatitutes in production and conauaption, •xt > 0 end the leaa-heclthy 
c110n9 cgents vith identical inco11es receive aore treataents. Of co~r&o, if X 
o.nd health ere Gu:fficiently strong co11pleaenta in the welfare function (exercise 
end health?>, it is possible that those agents consuaing high levels of X will 
also derAand nore trsat11enta, even if X and tare &ubatitutea in health 
productionJ the a&&ociation between pre-treataent health end the level of 
treataenta depends both on the health technology and on preferences. 
Under a rationing regiae <III>. such a& one in which treataents are 
allocated across agent& ·to aaxiaize health value-added. as in <5>, however, the 
relationship between pre-treat.Jent health (or health inputs> and treataenta 
depends solely on the·propertiea of the health technology: 
(9) 
~references for health play no role as they do under en agent-aovoreignty 
re9i ■ e. Knowledge of the health technology i& then sufficient to ascertain how 
the rationing_or co~pulaory health insurance regiae would allocate aedicol 
treatMenta across p3ople of different health gtatu& coapared to any existing 
health care syate•. 
8 
It ia, of courae, i•po••ible to prodiot how the inooae-trNtaent 
aa&ociation will differ ocroa& the tbr•• health deli•ery regi••• without 
iapoain9 a great deal aore atructure on th• Model. It ia thua not posaible to 
infer the regiae fro• the distribution of treataenta by inco••• Bowsver, 
coaparieona of reduced-fora and conditional (on pre-treataent health) incoae 
effect• on treetaent& can under certain conditions identify how income end 
health care. prices interact, with few additional a&&uaption&. In the rationing 
re9iae, for @Y.ample, there is no relation&hip between income and treat&ent& 
aaon9 agents with the same pro-treataent health status; treatfflent& vary aero&& 
income groups under that regime solely due to difierences in the consu•ption of 
X <which varies by incollle) or in endow•ents (which do not vary with incoJRe, by 
-aaauaption>. -The absence of any incoae effect conditional on pre-treataent 
health status thus identifies a syste• in which forMal health services are 
allocated on the basis of "need.. alone, defined strictly in health terJRs. 
When treatments are allocated in 6 nQrJllnl market, (no agent-specific 




where dtil/dFi is tho reduced-for• income effect fro• CG> and dtiwl/dFi is the 
conditional inco~e effect from <7> under regi~e I. The conditional incoRe 
effect will be positive, if Xis a nor•al good an1 Xi and heclth tre~t~ents are 
aubstitutes. Moreover, it is readily seen fro• (10> that treat~ents will vary 
aore strongly (and positively) with incoae among agents with the sa•e pre­
This is ~erely the well-know~treataent health status than across all agents. 
result froa rationing theory, en application of ·LaChatelier's p1·inciple, that 
condition~l incoMe effects exceed reduced-forJll incoae effects for goods that are 
substitutes for the ..rationed" good. Thus, if treatffients are.allocated in a 
9 
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regular aarket. •controlling for" differentials in pre-treataent health 
increases diaporitiea in treataent by inco•• rather than reduces the•. 
Wh~n treataent prices vary with incoae. the gifference between the health­
conditioned income effect and the unconditional or reducod-for~ inco•e effect is 
given by 
dtiII= s i d. XiII<11> xt [dX , ] 
- dF1 - 8 xx dpt pt + dFi 
Here. bacauae inco~e and price effects move together. when health-related 
consuMption goods and treatMents are substitutes ~nd Pt' < 0 (higher-income 
agents are subsidized), the conditional inco•e effect on treataents May be leso 
than the unconditional effect--incoae-relcted disparities in treatments ~ay be 
emaller within groups of similar pre-treataent at~tus than across the whole 
population. If low-2ncoae agent& tend to receive the highest aedical care 
subaidiea, however, t.he relationship between income and treat•ents within health 
lroup& will be stronger than the association between incoae and treatments for 
the overall population, as in the noraal aarket c~se. The intuition for the 
foraer result. which provides a (weak> test for the existence of a regressive 
health pricing regi~E.t~· is that expression <11) coiabines two well-known results 
fro• rationing theoz·y - that conditional exceed unconditional inco1te effect.s and 
~onditional own (coMponsated) price effects ara w~aker than their unconditional 
counterparts for <nor~al> goods that are substitutes for the fixed good. If a 
ri&e in inco1te also lowers the treat11ent price. tt.e weakening of the price 
effect offsets the usual strengthening of the inc~•e effect. 
Another reason why iltplicit treat11ent price-& 1u1y vary with inco111e is given 
in the household production literature <Becker, 1965; Acton, 1975>. If the 
value of tbe is hi9h9r for high-incoae agents and use of Medical care is a 
tiae-intensive activity, then the shifts in substitution and inco~e effects 
10 
ecroaa oonditional end unconditional trectaent equation• reinforce ecch other. 
Only if the iBplicit aubsidy to hi9h-inc011e agenta i& sufficiently high vill 
unconditional exce&d conditional incoae effects on treataenta. 
Eatiaction of the health technology and of both reduced-for• end 
conditional Con health> treataent equation& thus provide& c aecns Ci) of 
eacertcining how aediccl treataenta ere allocated according to health &t3tua in 
a given he~lth-regiae, (ii) of coapcring the existing health-related trectaent 
allocations to those that would exist under c "needa-bc&ad" syste11, end <iii) o! 
describing the acnner in which medical c~re coeta end incoae interact on 
balance~ in addition to providing Measures of incoae disparities in the 
allocation of Medical treatRent& within groups co~parable in pre-treataent 
health status. 
2. ·Prenatal Care end Birthweight 
e. The Data and Sppcification of the Technology 
The preceding discussion suggested th~t to a5sess how the prevailing 
aedical care regiae influence& the distribution of aedicel services across 
heterogeneous agents requires inforMation not only on agents' socioecono~ic 
,qharacteristic& ~nd l'.~dical treataents received, but also on agents' pre-
beat•ent health statuo ·and on behavior relevant to health. Such «n analysis of 
the distribution of aadical treataents caong adults would be heroic indeed. 
There is en anorMous rango of behavior that M6Y potentially relate to health 
and aany health indicators. Moreover, infor~ation on the entire life-history of 
each agent would presumably be required. The analysis of prenatal infant care, 
however, is aore feasible since the life-history cf the relevant agent is 
necessarily short, specific indicators of health appear to be More salient than 
other&, and the nuabe, of beh~viors and treatasnt& potentially relevant to birth 
outco•es ia relatively s~all. 
11 
The 1980 lfotiond Natclity Yollowback Survey <NNF5> i& well-&uited to an 
analysis of the diatribution of traat••nta acroaa infant& and pregnant voaen. 
· It provide• birth outcoae inforaation on a probability aa•pla of all li•• birth& 
in the United 5tutea in 1980 coabined with infor ■ ation on the aocioeconoaic 
characteristics of the child's parents, on the aother'a behavior while pregnant 
that i& deemed relevant by the aedical profession to birth outcoaes, and on all 
aedical treataente received by the aother during her pregnancy and at the birth 
of the infant bused on birth certificate infornation and on questionnaire& sent 
to both tho mother and her doctor<s>. Fro• these data, a working sa~ple of 7669 
legiti•ate births with the requisite inforaation waa obtained. The 1980 NNFS 
was drawn by over-saapling (4 to 1> fro11. the strata of births under 2500 grams, 
with the obJective of better understftnding the deter•ninants of low birthweight. 
If we neglected the waighting of the saaple by the dependent variable, our 
analysis would yield ~ia~ed and inconsistent esti~ates. We have, thus, repeated 
observations on births over 2500 graaa four tiaes, to create a self-weighting 
eaaple, end reduced the nuaber of degrees of freedo• in statistical tests to the 
original sample size. 
Froa informcti?n·provided on the county or county-group of aother'& 
residence in the 1980 NNFS, variables were appended to the individual data to 
characterize the cour.ty or county-group of residence to serve cs identifying 
instruaent& in the e~pirical analyses, described ~)elow. These variables include 
the characteristic& of local medical and faaily planning infrastructure, aedical 
personnel, public expenditures, coaposition of e•~loyaent and uneaployaent, an~ 
local price& of cigarette& and alcohol. and are dnscribed in Appendix Tcble A. 
We eaploy a& our indicator of early child health the weight of the child ct 
birth. a salient preoictor of both infant 11ortality and subsequent health and 
intellectual achievement (National Academy of Sciences, 1985). We first esti-
12 
aate the birthweight product.ion function. oorre&pondin9 to <2>. in order to 
. enawer t,hree queationa. firat, doaa porental behavior. net of aedical treat­
••nta\ influence "the birth outcoae (child heGlth)? Second, do prenatal aedical 
treatnenta affect birthwei9ht? Third. ia the efficGcy of aedical treataenta 
r•lated to the characteristic of the birth; naMely, do the effects of aedical 
treataenta interoct with the pre-treat~ent behavioral 'input& choaen by ~rents? 
We have in part already an&wered th~ fir&t question in our prior analyses of 
birthwei9ht <Rosenzweig and Schultz. 1982 and 1983> baaed on data for 1967-69 
froa a predecessor aurvey to the 1$80 NNFS. In those analyses we found that 
such pre-treatnent behavior aa the tiain9 end nuaber of birth&, smoking by the 
. 
aother, and the rapidity with which prenatal care was first sought by the Mother 
after conception signi£icantly effected birthweight and fetal growth. However, 
we did not exaaine the effect& of these inputs net of subsequent prenatal 
aedical treatment& nor the interactions between tr~atments and the parentally­
chosen inputs, due to the lack of information on aedical services in those. 
earlier data. 
In the present analysis we examine the influence on birthweight of the .pre­
treatrAent ·Variables aentioned and three co••on lletlical procedures applied ,Prior 
to delivery to identify and aonitor potential proplea& of the pregnancy-­
caniocentesis, ultrasound and fetal x-rays. In addition we evaluate how the 
(prior> interval between births and the nu~ber of visits aade by the aother 
during her pre9nancy affects birthweight. The interval between the current 
birth and the previous birth is co~aonly attributed a role in deter•ining the 
•other'& health and the child'& birthweight, at least for short intervals 
(National Acadeay of Sciences, 1985). The nuMber of prenatal visits in addition 
to the delay in firct seeking prenatal IAedical care provides another indicator 
of the •other's actual use of Medical care. The A~erican College of 
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Obstetricicns -tmd Gynecologist• <1982) recoaaend& a aother plan on about 13 
prenatal care •viait&J" the average nuaber in the 1980 NNFS waa 10.9. The 
ti11ing of initial prenatal care and nuaber of viaita ere, of courae, invoraely 
correlated. Conaequently the aeasured effect of each ia aen&itive to whether 
the other variable ia excluded. 
Of the four treat~ent& adainiatered to pregnant woaen considered here-­
aaniocente&ia, ultrasound, x-ray, and caesarean &ection--the first three are 
used to confira fetal develop•ent and position during pregnancy. whereas the 
caesarean section procedure pGrtain& to the actual delivery of the infant. The 
first three procedure& applied during the pregnancy thus ffiay directly affect the 
~evelopaent of the fetu& and are included aaong the determinants of birthweight. 
As discussed, neither the pre-treatMent health behavior of parents nor the 
treatments are likely to be randosly allocated. Tt,e existence of un•ea&ured, 
exog,enous characteristic& of births possibly known to the parents and/or doctors 
aake& it likely that oll of the potential health-related decision variables wiU 
be correlcted with the error terJi in the production function equation, as we 
found in o.ur earlier study. It is even aore likely that the Medical procadure& 
are used selectively. If, for exa•ple, the treatment& are predominantly used 
<avoided) in ca6es where the pregnancy is likely to result in a low birthweight 
baby, the treataentu Might appear to exhibit an inverse (direct) partial 
correlation with birthweight to the extent that ths included v~riables do not 
coMprehensively ~easure the initial health of the fetus or aother. But when 
this correlation ia•estillated by Methods that are free of bias due to treat11ent 
&election, a positive <negative> birthweight effect Might be inferred for an 
average aother. 
To obtain consistent estiMatea of the effects of both the treat•ents and 
the pre-treataent purental behavior, we eMploy two-stage least squares. The 
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aodel au99o&t& that price& <or their proxies) of the inputs a& well a& the 
pricaa of all con&unption good&, whether or not such good& influence health, 
aerve a• natural inatru-.enta for esti~ation of the paraaeter& of tho production 
technology, aa long a& such price& are uncorrelated with the unmeasured health 
endowaent. Accordingly, we use our coaaunity-level variable&, listed in the 
appendix, oa well aa parents' achooling attainaent and husband'• incoae a& 
identifying in&truaents. That is, the deMand equation& <G> are the first-&tage 
eq.iation&.3 
Econoaic theory does not provide any insights into the functional fora of 
the biological production function describing the relationships betw~en parental 
behavior. aedical treatnents and health. In the 1967-69 NNS we analyzed general 
second-order approxiaations of the linear and log-linear production functions 
<i.e.~ Leontief-Diewert and Tronslog specifications> to ·allow for these and 
other nonlinearities and interactions in the birthweight production function. 
Our statistical teHts of the aigni:ficance of the, 1r.any additional paralletera 
required to fit th~se aecond-order approxiaations were reJected when appropriate 
esti•ation procedures w~re eaployed; nonlinearities may nonetheless be i~portant 
in certain cases, but they proved difficult to estiaate because of collinearity 
of inputs and the data require•ents of the two-stage estiaation technique. In 
our analysis of the 1980 NNFS we have retai_ned the quadratic ter• for •other's 
age and test for interactions between the 11edicto.l treat•ents and the endogeneous 
birth characteristi.cs. A quadr(ltic in births 01° parity was never statistically 
significant in the two-stage estimates. and only specifications oaitting those 
variables are repor.ted. Moreover, the birthweight effect of birth order i& 
apparently due to lower weight for the first child; on indicator of whether or 
not the birth is the first i& thus included in all specifications, but nu~ber of 
births is excluded. The first birth du•~Y vari~ble i& also needed to esti~ate 
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the effect of the prior birth interval, which i& of cour&e undefined for first 
In addition to the endogeneou& treataent variable.sand pre-treat•ent birth 
charact~ristics, we also include in the specification of the birthweight 
technology four characteristic& of the birth and the aother not subJect to 
choice but likely to be related to birthweight--the height and race of the 
11other, the &ex of the infant and whether or not the birth is part of a multiple 
birth (plural>. Inclusion of the race of the Qother <Black or not-Black> 
enables a test of the hypothesis that racial differences in birthweight can be 
explained solely in ter11ts of differences in parent behavior and/or a different 
incidence of formal, prenatal Medical treataents. 
E&timation of the birthweight technology using consistent aethods also 
pernit& ~easurement of the individual birthweight endowaent for the Mothers in 
the .&a11ple. To comp)Jte the birth endow111ents, the consistent two-stage 
estiaatea of the birthwei9ht production function are co ■ binad with tne actual 
birth _characteristics and treatments for each woaan to predict her child's 
birthweight 
(12) B~i <a: B + B X. + B t . 
1 , 0 1 1 2 1 
where the B denote the line~rized para•eter estimatea of the second fora of 
equation <2>. The difference between realized birthweight and predicted 
birthweight, fro• (12>, is defined as the birthweisht endow•ent u., although it 
1 
also includes an error associated with ffleasureMent,i.e., 
(13) u = B - B~ = i i 1 
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Thi& JRea&ure of the health endow111.ent of the child i& included in the reduced­
fora equation& for the various for•a of health behavior and the treataent& 
discussed in section c, below, to assess how both the parents' behavior and the 
allocation of treataents respond to the endowed healthiness of the child. 
b. Esti~ate~ of the Birthwei9ht Effects of Parent Behavior and Treat111.ents 
' 
Table 2 reports the OLS and two-stage least &quare& <TSLS) estiaates for 
three specific~tions of the birthweight production function: the first excludes 
the specific Medical treataents (cols. 1 and 2>. The second specification 
includes in linear for~ the three prenatal Medical treatments (cols. 3 and 4>. 
The third specification peraits treataent effects to vary by the •other's age, 
the parity of the birth, and whether· the pregnancy results in a aultipl~ birth 
Ceola. 5 and G>. 
EstiJlation procedure does subst.antially .al tE",r. inferences concerning t.he 
effects of both the aedical treatments and parent behavior net of treatMents. 
for exa~ple, a~ong the birthweight inputs deterJ11ined by the parents, the OLS 
, results indicate that_the length of the previous birth interv.al is inversely 
cissociated with birthw.ei9ht, whereas the TSLS esth,ates indic.ate the opposite. 
It May be inferred that mothers who are more likely to have (to have had> larra 
healthy babies ior reasons that are uncorrelated with our instruments also tend 
to space their births closer together, generating the observed inverse partia! 
association COLS estifflates>. The coiisistently-e.et.iJ11atedCTSL5) biological effect 
of an added year's spacing, on the other hand, .it a gain of nearly SO graas. To 
evaluate the effect of being a first born, it is• necessary to subtract froM the 
coefficient on "first-born" the previous birth interval coefficient ~ultiplied 
by the average interval for later births (46.3). The two-stage least squares 
estimates iRply first born babies are about 300 9raMs lighter, on average, while 
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Tacle 2. 
Estimates of the B1rtn~eig ►.t Procuct1on Function Ir;:luc1ng l'lei:1ca! Treatments 
Inputs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6} 
Estiaation Procedure CLS TS...S CLS TS..S OLS T~S 
Con=~tior;s a: birtn 
Age of rothera 14.e 118 10. 7 127 12.2 178 
(2,37)0 (2.35) (1.81) (2. 45i (2.02) (2.34) 
Age squar~ -.225 -2.27 -.158 -2..46 -.183 -2.65 
(2. 07) (2. 41 > (1.44) (2.52) (1.63) ( 1. 8. > 
first BorrF -113 -186 -114 -199 -113 119 
(12.4) (2.19) (le.SJ (2.17i (10. l) (0.71) 
Previous c1rtn interva12 -.428 2.55 -.427 2.11 -.44l 3,79 
(2.96) (l.77) (2.97) (1.39) <:s.e:::i (1. 76} 
Be1avior of ~~tier ~~ile or~Qr,ant 
Delay before saw doctora 14.8 -8.43 14. 6 -14.8 14.8 -9.25 
(6.92) (0.45) (6.84) (~. 75) (6.91} (0,33) 
Pre~~tal care v1sitsa 27.0 a>.~ 2f..S 23.7 26.B 33.3 
t26. e; (3.63) (2&. 71 (2. 91) (25.6) (2. 78) 
Ciearettes 5/i!oket per ca1.a -11.0 -13. 7 -11.1 -13.8 -11.0 -il.5 
(25. 5) (4. 01 > (25.5i (3.73) (25.5) (2.25) 
l':e~ica; trea:re~ts currnc ::reor,an£!: 
Arnr:io::entesisa -BB.2 31i -137 -376 
(5. 44) (l, 4~} {1,5B) <0.22) 
tJltrase:unca 8.17 51.5 -43.7 779 
(1,2i) (0. 75) (1.09) (1.24) 
I-Raya · 14. 7 -i5f · 193 5.~ 
.(1.63) -{1,4E,l (3.50) (5.46) 
Amniocentesis·x age of mtneril 2.27 21.e 
(0. 79i (0.47i 
A:imiccer.te;;is x pl:ira~ birtna 188 4938 
(l.85) (2.12) 
frr.r,iccentesis x .:lirt~, o:·t-e~ -72.7 61.5 
(1,96) 10.05) 
Uitrasc~~d X a;ee 1.63 -24.3 
(i.12) <1.e-s, 
Ultrasound x plura: birtn° 123 -13.S 
,2.4e.i (0,,15i 
Ul traSOUT..J x bl rt:i orcer.a 1&.3 -19'3 
(1.27} (0.61) 
X-Ray x a;ea -6.29 -1S4 
(3.2~) (5. 65) 
X-Ray x plural birtn° 116 i335 
(2.20) (1.22) 
X-Ray .x nir:n orce:-B -41.4 -1155 
(2.17} (3.ei; 
Exo~enous characteristics of ei~ilc and 1110ther 
Black -228 -'i5! -227 -266 ~ -259 
(18.9) <1&. l > !18.8) (15.4) (18.6) (10. 2) 
Fe11ale ir,far.~ -149 -149 -150 -146 -150 -144 
(22. 8) (21. 7) (22.9) (20.1) (11.8) (14. 8) 
Plt.-ral birth -945 -974 -549 -961 -1075 -1628 
(3&.5) (36.3i (38.5) (28.7) (25. 7) (2.39) 
Heig~t of sotier 32.6 32.9 32.5 33.4 32.S 35.7 
(26.3i (25.2). (26,2) (23. 9) (26,2} (19.0) 
Iriterce:it 915 -297 989 -384 969 -2as1 
(8.40) (0,46) (8, TT> (0.53) 8.45) (1,90} 
fF .150 .151 .152 
F 412 263 327 200 20! n.e 
a. Enoo2er.ous variable. 
b. Asymptotic ·t-ratios in paJ"entheses beneath coeff1c1ents 
the OLS estiaate& indicate that first-born children, ceterit paribus, weigh only 
93 graM& less than any younger aibling& at birth. 
Adverse &9lection by aothers is evident in the estiaate& of the conse­
quence& of delay by the aother& in &eein9 a doctor while pre9nant. The nu~ber 
of aonths that elapse into the pregnancy prior to a doctor visit is positively 
and significantly associated with birthweight according to the (biased) OLS 
esti~ates, but is negatively and insignificantly related to birthwei9ht in the 
two-stage estiMates. This strong selection bias was also found in our prior 
work on the earlier saMple. The nuMber of prenatal care visit& the woaan had at 
the tiMe of her delivery, however, is positively associated with her having a 
larger baby whichever estiMation procedure is used--the two-stage estiaate& in 
coluan 2 suggest that added prenatal visits exert a saall but not insignificant 
• benefit to the child's birthweight of 26 graas per visit. The 9ross 
quantitative effect of prenatal visits, aoreover, i& not reduced when the 
various aedical treatments that Might occur during such visits are explicitly 
entered into the second specification of the birthweight production function. 
The estiaates indicate that a Mother who had, say, five visits rather than the 
safflple average of ll w9uld incur a deficit in her child's birthweight of about 
140 grams or 4.2 perGent, on average (i.e., 24 x 5.9 = 142). 
The t~o-stage loast squares estimates also a~~i9n substanti~l i~portance to 
the mother's age in influencing the baby's birthwcight: fertility ti•ing is 
iaportant. The optimal Maternal age _at birth is 26 in all specification&. 
The ~agnitude of the estimated TSLS age gradient is substantial: a Mother at a9e 
18 or 34 could expect according to the esti•ate~ in col. (4) of Table 2 to have 
a child who would be 160 grams smaller than a mother who has her child at the 
preferred age of 26. The estifflates of the effects of the other pre-treataent 
variables on birthweight conform to our prior findings, including the iMp~rtance 
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of Maternal &aoking and the existence of a significant Black-White bi~thwei9ht 
differential <in favor of White&) net of both parental input& and aedical 
procedures <Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983)). In &UM, the parent&' pre-treataent 
behavior, net of treataents, aignificantly influence& the birth outco••• 
The estiMate& of the effects of the three prenatal treataent& in 
specification 2 also show the i•portance of adJu&ting for the non-rondo• 
allocation of Medical care for inferring the health effects of such care. For 
exaMple, the OLS esti~ate of the birthweight effect pf a~niocentesis i& 
&ignificant and negative (-88 graas), whereas the estiaates that correct for 
treat•ent selection suggest& that this procedure increases the baby'& birth­
weight by 310 graa&, although the estiaate is not very precise. X-r5ys, on the 
other hand, appear t.o be related to a 16 gro.11 weight gain in the OLS regressior;, 
but according to the two-stage estiMates this procedure contributes to a weight 
los& of 156 gra•s. However, the two-stage esti•ate is again'statistically 
significant at only the 15 percent confidence level. Neither the direct nor the 
instruDental variable e&ti•ate& of the effects of ·ultrasound procedures detect 
any ef!~ct on birthweight. 
In the third specification. the estiaate& indicate that the birthweight 
effects of both amniocentesis and fetcl x-rays vary significantly with the 
characteristics of the fetus and P-other& with. however. ultrasound again being 
insignificantly rel~ted to birthwaight. In particular, amniocentesis enhances 
the weight of babie~ at birth when the births are plural, and fetal x-rays 
appear to reduce bir·thweight ~ost for older Mothero and for higher-parity 
births. but are beneficial when the births are plural. That is, among young 
mothers having their first birth and carrying •ore.than one baby, x-rays on net 
~ay aid in increasing birthweight. Treataents thus mattor for birth outco~e&, 
and their effects depend on the pre-treatment choices of parents. 
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Finally. If all relevant behavioral inputs are accounted for in our 
onaly&e&. our eatiaate of the Black-White birthweight deficit~ of about 7 
percent. fro• coluan 6 of Table 2, acy be interpreted e& biological in origin, 
in accord with &oae of the ■ edical literature suggesting that the saaller pelvic 
stru~ture of Black woaen aay be conducive toward low-~eight Black babies at 
birth <with gubsequent aore rapid post-natal growth aaong survivor& of low­
weight infancy>. The inherent frailty of Black infants that these result& 
&uggest has iaportant iaplicationa for the interpretation of racial difference& 
in the distribution of aedical treataents, discussed below. 
c. Reduced-Fora Esti•ates: Pre-Treatment Inputs and Trect~ent Equations 
Table 3 reports the estiaates of the reduced-for• equations relating the 
exogeneous characteristics of the fflothers and their children to (i> pre­
treatment health-related decisions of the parent& ~nd Cii) the probability of 
receiving each _of the four medical treat•ents. With respect to the latter •. 
Table 3 recapitulates Table 1. except that one can assess the effects of 
socioeconoPic characteristics on the probabilities of receiving the treataents 
in a aultivariate context, end measure the effect~ of the exogeueous endowaent 
of the infant on both the mother's pre-treatment behavior and the treataents. 
The NMFS provides three variables ch~racterizing the socioeconoaic status 
of the faaily. the ~other's and father'& &choolins attainnent. and the husband'& 
incoae. To capture possible non-linearities at the lower tail of the incoae 
distribution. evident in Table 1 for soae of the treat•ent variable&, we clso 
constructed a categorical variable taking on the value of one if the husband'& 
incoae was less than SG000. To the extent that subsidized aedical care is 
provided a& part of co~pensation for full-time workers, we would expect the 
effects of husband's income <and husband's schooling> to reflect both inco~e and 
health price <subsidy) effects, while the effect& of the schooling attainMent of 
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Table 3 . 
Effects of Exoger.ous Health Status arrci Parent,l Cnaracteristics on Characteristics 
of Births and Probabilities of Receiving Specif1c ~1cal Treat111entsi 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5i (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Mother's NUli::>er Delay in Num::>er 
Selectec Age at of Pr_enatal of Amnio- Ultra- Caesareari 
Explanatory va~iables/ Birtn Birt!'ls Care visits S,,;o-:1 n: cer.tes1s ..!Q!:[£_ X-Ray ~!10?": 
Estimation Procecure OLS OLS OLS DLS Oi..S !tll.Prob1 t Mi..Probit l>ILProbit !L'-:..."'!"O:llt 
Exooeoous healtn status -.371 -.0552 , 195 -. 29-1 1.32 -1.89 -£.19 -.354 -.142 
<;1e-31 (8. 26) b (4.77;b <12.4) (8.64) 0 (17,,4):l (42. l)C (4, 75)C (22, 7)C (9,5,2)C 
Mother's scnoc:in; .417 -.0877 -.i546 .1t2 -.555 -,00558 ,00544 .0~9 .e21B 
(27.2) (21.8) (1~. 0) (6. 93) (21.51 (0.62) (1.21) (5.64) (4.14) 
Husband's SC~:);)ling .123 -.0316 -. 0384 .0857.., -. 125 •00939 .0235 • t.153 -.~JSl 
(8. 52) (8.33) (7. 47} (7. 95} (5.13) (1. 09) (5. 60) (2. 97) <e. 72) 
ttus~artd' s ircoo!? 151 23, 1 -10.9 6.95 -1!. i 12. 7 -. 0131 2.39 1.62 
he 1e-t1 139.Sl (23.21 (8.05) (2.45) (l. ii':i (5.85) 10.eu (1.82) ii ;:,::;·,. ··--· ttusoart' s iriccee •138 .0357 • 171 -,Jel •84-4 .100 •0-'.:"o2 -.e334 -. le.5 
J. $62~0 (1.36) (1. 49) (4. 75) (3.97i (4. 94i (1.54) ·10. 88) (0.%) i3.i2) 
BlacK .299 -.215 -.25e -.559 -.145 .0931 -.es3e -.234 .17& 
(0.88} (2. 41) (2.10) (2.20) <e.2€,i (2. 41) (0.2'2) (0.87) tt.W 
a. Ts:ile de.es mt reoor~ coefficients for cc,mr.::mity-le,el varia.:le~ li:;te-: in fi;:)&ridix Ta:ile A-1 sr,o includer: ir; t1e 
speci ficat 1or,s. 
b. A~~lute values oft-ratios be~~ath coefficients in coilli;m, 
c. Absolute values of asYJllptotic t-ratios tier,eath t'oefficients in columr.. 
r, 
the aother, for given huaband'a incoMe, will aore nearly corre&pond to pure 
inco•e effecta, oa leaa than one-half of aarried woaen below age 49 hold full­
tiae Job&. Schooling aay al&o reflect health <tiae> preference, ond/or 
abilities to produce <pre-treataent) health <Gro&&Dan, 19721 fucha, 1982; 
Haveaan and Wolfe, 1984). If •other'& schooling i& a&&ocicted positively with 
preference& for health, given price& and incoae, or schooling augaent& household 
and aarket productivity equally, the difference between reduced-fora end 
conditional •other'& schooling effect& on treataent& would be &iailar to that 
a&&ociated with pure incoae effects. If, a& noted above, those woaen with 
higher lE1vel& -of schooling have higher opportunity cost& of th1e, and receiving 
treatllents i& a tiae-intansive activity, then conditional will exceed reduced­
fora schooling effect& even if pure incoae effect& are saall or non-existent • 
. The.correspondence& between the reduced-for11 and conditional Con pre-treat.1tent 
~ealth inputs> effects of husband's inco11e and schooliri9 in the treataent 
equations aay thus differ. 
The estiaated affect& of the healthiness(µ.) of the child. net of parental
l. 
and aedical inputs, on both sets of inputs are significantly differe-nt from zero 
at the 0.005 level, despite.the unavoidable errors in ~easuring the 
birthwaight endow~ent; as discussed eorliar. The estimates indicate th~t each 
of the four •adical treat1tents i& les& likely to be provided to observ~tionally 
identical aothers \Jith healthier (heavier> infants. Pre-treataent health and 
11edical treataent& are evidently substitute&; that is, treat11ents are allocated 
disproportionally lo the proble11 pregnancies. 
The relationstip& between the endogenous, pre-treataent characteristics of 
the births and the 9ndowments also su99est coapensatory behavior by parents. In 
particular, •others with healthier infants delay seeking medical care and visit 
the doctor less often. Thus, healthier infants receive significantly less 
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aedical care. Roreover, mothers with healthier infant& (net of inputa>·are aore 
likely to have the infant& later in life <which beyond age 26 reducea birth­
vei9ht> and to &soke More cigarettes while pregnant (which reduce& birthweight 
for any age at birth>. Theae reaults thu& auggest that inequalitiea acroas 
infants in endowed health, aa aeasured by birthwaight net of parental Gnd 
aedical inputs, are greater than inequalities in actual birth outcoaea as a 
result of both the co11penaatory pre-treatMent resource allocative decisions of 
parents and the allocation of Redical treataent.s. 
The pre-treat•~nt endogenous birth characteristic& and the probabilities of 
receiving sedical treatnent& are also significantly correlated with the 
&ocioeconoaic chf'racterist.ics of parents. The results in Table 2 suggested that 
parental decisions concerning the tiMing, spacin~, and nu11ber of births, and 
~•okin9 during .the pregnancy Qffect birthweight net of treatments while the 
treatment& affect birthweight differentially according to the endogenous 
c~aracteristics of the birth. The reduced-fora results in Table 3 indicate that 
parents' socioeconoliic cbaracteri&tics.; significantly influence pre-treat11ent 
. decisions; thus, it is not surprising that net of endow11ents, the aedical 
trectaent& are also co~related with the characteristics of the parents. The 
existence of the reduced-for• associations between parental socioeconoaic 
characteristic~ ~nd the likelihood of prenatal treat11ents cannot therefore 
inforat us on whether infants of &i1tilar pre-treall\ent health--gross of parental 
inputs--ara equally likely to receive medical tre~tments regardless of parental 
resources. This is because parents with different schooling levels end inco~e 
evidently bring to the Medical syste• for treat•ent infant& with different 
charecteristics, 
The reduced-for• estiMates reported in Tablo 3 indicate that husband'& 
inco~e end •other'& schooling have qualitatively similar effects. For exaaple, 
22 
infent& born to lower-<husband'a) incoae parents are born earlier in the 
aother'a lifo-cycle, and. partioularly in low-inco•• household•• are of lover 
parity, receive aedical care le&& frequently and later after conception, and are 
aore exposed to aatornal aaoking. The aothera of auch infanta are also 
significantly le&& likely to receive aaniocente&ia and x-ray& while pregnant, 
and are le&a likely to receive a caesarean section at the birth of the child 
(particularly, in the latter case, for ~others with husbands earning lec.s than 
$6000 per year>. Infant& born to leas-educated •others, given their father's 
schooling and incoae, tend to be born earlier in the mother's life-cycle, and to 
be of higher parity. Such 11others also &eek prenatal care le&& frequently and 
less-rapidly, saoke aore while pregnant and are le&s likely to receive x-rays 
and e cses8rean sectJ.on. 
For given parental socioeconomic characteristics. Black infants also have 
different (endo9enou$) cliaracteristic& co11pared to White infants-- they tend to 
be of lower parity and to receive prenatal aedical care &i9nificantly ln& 
rapidly and less frequently. Black 11other& are no less likely, however, given 
_their incone and education. to receive ultra-sound, x-rays or a caesarean 
section than are White mothers, but are significantly less likely to receive 
oaniocentasis. The gross differentials by race in the incidence of 11edical 
&ervices among pregn~nt women evident in Table 1 ~an thus al•ost wholly be 
accounted for by racial differences in parents' education and incoae. However, 
Black infant& differ in endogenous c~aracteristics fro• infants born to White 
aothers, as is evident in columns 1 through 5 in Table 3. Horeovor, Black 
infants, for given pre-treataent inputs, are &~~ller than White infant& <Table 
2>. Thus, the absence of &i9ni:ficant treatl'llent differentials in the reduced­
fora equations does not i11ply that there are no racial differentials in the 
incidence of medical treat11ent among in!~nt& ££•parable in health-related 
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chorocteriatica. To aaaeaa thi• diatributional iaaue, o• noted at the outset, 
requires that the deterainant& of treataent& be assessed "controlling for" pre­
treataent conditiona,which we exaldne below. 
d. Conditional Treat~ent Eguctipn& 
Table 4 report& two-stage, aaxiaua-likelihood probit eatiaotes of the 
effects of the endogenous, pre-treataent birth characte1·istic& of the infant and 
of parents' Gocioeconoaic characteristic$ on the likelihood of receiving each of 
the four aedical treatment&. Table 5 reports the test statistic& associated 
with assessing the null hypotheses for each treatment that (i) the pre-treataent 
birth characteristics are uncorrelated with the treatment equation residuals 
.(which include the un111easured health status of the infant> and <ii> the set of 
parental socioeconc~ic characteristics <income end schooling>, net of the birth 
~haracteristics influencing child ~ealth and the efficacy of the treat11ents. ase 
not significantly'as&ociated with the probability of receiving the treat11ent.4 
for ell but aaniocentesis, these hypotheses are ~eJected at ct least the .01 
level; both hypotheses are re3ected ct the .10 level for amniocentesis. Thus.· 
the re~ults reported in Table 4 suggest that net of the i11portant health-relat0d 
characteristic& of infants determined in part by parents. parental inco~e and 
schooling play an additional role in who gets treat~ents.5 The regi•e of equal 
treatnents for e~ucl conditions does not appear to characterize the allocation 
of Medical care, circa 1980 in the United Statesg with respect to pregnant 
w011en. 
The estinata5 in Table 4 also indicate that the incidence of prenatal 
treatMents differi by the characteristics of the child that are influenced by 
parents' decisions. For exa11ple. infants with mothers who del(ly seeing a doct()r 
and who s11oke are less likely to receive any of the four treatMents, while 
Mothers of closely-spaced infants are 11ore likely to receive x-rays ~nd a 
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Ta:,le 4 
Effects of Birth Characteristics ar~ Parental Characteristics on 
.-ectica! Treatments: Two-Stage I"'... Probit Estimates 
Selected ex::a•,atory Amniocentesis Ul trasoun.'.l X-Rav Caesa~ea~ fu?ctior,
va:-1ables (1) (2) Cl (2) (1) (2) (l) (2i 
Birt!'l Cr,ara::-te-s:hr::s 
· Exoge!"!Ous r,:alth status (xai-2) -.114 -.119 .0!54 .034~ -. 0334 -.0595 -.eJa3 -.W.5
(11. 6)b (5.52i (3.34) (4.13) (5.9S) (5. 97) (7.08) 15.Sai
Age of mo!r;f':"' at b1rtha -.295 -.e56 -.159 -.04~ -.228 -.578 -.60S -1.82
(1.~) (0.58) (1. 17) (0.21) (1.39) (2.~) (3. 781 (7. 23)
Age of rot;e- squaredacxie-2> .553 .498 .239 -.050 .398 1.e3 1.H .339
(1.00) (0.59) (0,34) (0.16) (1.~) (2.22) (J.89i (7.35)
~u•ber of :1rttJcl .380 .623 -.294 . -.01?-Bt -. ~367 .181 • 157 • 12p
(2.05) (2.51} (3.46) (0.07) (0,36) (1. 3£.i (1.55) (7.35)
First i;:;,r~ .215 1,25 .441 1.05 -.543 -.6~3 .t~ -.363
(0. 32) (1.58) (l,45) (2. 91) (l, lj£) (1.44) (0, 101 ~0.84)
Previous b:r.~ interval(il) -.00$86 -.00482 .0207 •0407 -.e~m -. i.22s . -.0!7a -.e~
(0.90) <e.38> (5.88) (6.%) (1.82) (3.23) 14,es: (3.~,2)
!".ot"ler s11,:>-:~a -.04Yr -.es% -.0!98 -.0253 -.9338 -.tjo57 -.t.21: -.00234
(2. 66) (1. 67) (2.48) (1,60i (3.52) (0.34) (2.2f) (0.12i
Delay in !J"'~,atal visita -.1n -.184 -.133 -.t4eS -. 268 -.354 -.243 -.222
(1.82) (1.37) (2.%} (~. 67} (4. 94) (4,69i (4. 62) (3.05)
Plural oi'rte: .e01 .242 .620 .507 .618 .620 •59'. .617
(1, 70) (1. 62) (9.83) (6.69) (9. 35) (7.43) (9. 0: > (7.49)
C.."la"'ac:te:-ist1~ c,f oa,..·erts 
~other1 s s:;:d in; -.0rnti .0455 •045€, .0765
(0.48) (2. 61 J (2.13) (3. 7~)
l'!us:>arid' s s::--.:,olin~ .0144 .'t458 • 009!1 .0135
(0. 91) (6. 44} u.eJ> (1. 57)
r'.',JSl;a'r.:i I S i!'.:-Olll:? (x10'."£J .29?- •t-525 3.41 2. 72
(0. 04) (J. 02) (0. 81) (0. 67}
Husband's irc.:rme i 60~ .eS&5 - .0771 -.i424 -.2.%
(0. 61) (1,88) <e. 84> (5. 93)
B:ack !111ot:ie-l -. 0l-B3 -.085 -.0282 ~.897 -.247 -.04&5 .137 .471
(4. ~) (3.57) (1.19) (2.23) (2.03) ce.ssi (2.Nl (1, 9l} 
a. Erllio;eno~s varia~le. 
:i. P.symo,ot:: .-raiios in oarentneses oer,eatn coeffic:ients. 
r 
Table 5 
Test Statistics, Treatment Equationsa 
Test 
Endogeneity.0£ Influence 0£ 
Trectment Birth Charccteristics Parental Characteristics 
Amniocentesis 12.3 32.0 
Ultrasound 50.6 230.2 
X-Ray 36.3 171.0 
Caesarean Section 72.9 140.0 
x2 Critical value, .05 12.6 35.2 
x2 Critical value, .01 16.8 41~6 
8. Likelihood ratio tests. 
caesarean &ection but are le&& likely to receive ultra&ound.6 Consistent with 
the estiaotea in Table 2 indicating that o•niocente&ia and x-rays ai9nificantly 
augMent the birthweight of babies born in a plural birth, both procedures Cos 
well o& ultrasound ond caesarean section> are significantly ~ore likely to be 
applied when there i& a plural birth. Despite, however, the finding reported in 
Table 2 that x-ray& lower birthwei9ht for higher-parity births born to older 
Mothers, such treataents appear to be provided More frequently to such births. 
But, of course, x-ray& and the other procedures ~ay aid in aMeliorating other 
conditions associated with aaternal age ond parity than weight at birth. 
Which of the two alternative aarket regines characterizing the allocation 
.of Medical treatfflents doainates--the regressive tax-subsidy regiae CII> or the 
Market regiae? Infant health and the set of prenatal treat11ents appear to be 
substitutes, as indicated by the reduced-for~ endowment effects on the 
probabilities of tre.:itllents in Table 3. The income eff.ects on treat:aents ~hould 
therefore be algebraically higher when esti11ated conditional on endogenous 
infant health attributes compared to the estiaated inco•e effects froa the 
· reduced for11s. wh€m thG 11arket regiae is characterized by income-independent 
prices. If i~plicit prices fall sufficiently with income, however, the 
conditional "income affects"' will be smaller than the unconditional incoae 
e:£:£ects. 
In the case of the three treat~ents for which we can reJect with confiden~e 
the hypothesis that .their provision depends solely on the health-related 
conditions of the pregnancy. the change in the coefficient associated·with th~ 
•other's schooling across the conditional and unconditional reduced-for• 
equations yields an una~biguous result. The conditional schooling coefficient 
is positive, statistically significant, and higher than its reduced-for• 
counterpart by nearly a factor of 10 for ultrasound. by 50 percent for x-rays, 
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and by 300 percent for ccoaarean &ectiona. Hothera of &iailor pre-treat•ent 
health atotus, but vith greater resource& and/or de~and for health, are not only 
aore likely to receive the three aedicol treataenta, but health-conditioned 
education difference& in treataent incidence exceed those difference& 
unconditioned on health status. Thi& pattern is in accord with health being a 
noraal good·in a noraal aarket for health treataents; thus, we can find no 
ovidence for the proposition that the iaplicit price of treataents fall& 
strongly with incoae.7 
The result& for the husband'& incoae variablas are &oaewhat less clear, 
because of the lack of precision of aost of the incoae coefficient& in Tables 3 
and 4. However. the conditional linear income coefficients ore greater than 
their reduced-fora counterparts for all three tre~tments for which the set of 
&ocioeconoaic variables are statistically significant <Table 5). Moreover. the 
&tatistically significant negative non-linear incoae tar• for caesareans <Tabl~ 
3) rises algebraically by 200 percent in the conditional equation and retain& 
it& statistical significance. There is thus li~tle evidence of a negative 
association between the i•plicit-treatMent price and inco~e. ~o&t certainly, 
Moreover, caesarean ~~ctions are significantly aore likely to be provided to 
~ore educated and higher inco~e families even a•ong wo~en with the sa•e health· 
status. 
Table 4 also indicates that there exist significant racial differences in 
the likelihood of receiving aedical treatments aaon9 wo~en with app~rently 
identical pre-treat•ent health conditions--Black "others otherwise identical 
with respect to both pre-treataent birth charact~ristics and schooling and 
inco~e are significantly less likely to receive amniocentesis and x-rays and are 
Marginally aore likely to receive a caesarean section compared to White 
P.others.8 The l~tter differential is consistent with the evidence concerning 
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racial differences in pelvic structure; however, the lower likelihood of 
receiving a•niocentesis and x-ray& aaong Blacks i& surprising given the evidence 
in Table 2 that even for given parental inputs Black babies are frailer than 
White babies. It is notable that differences in pre-treat~ent behaviors across 
race groups, not accounted for in the reduced-foras or in the gross racial 
differentials displayed in Table 1, aask significant racial disparities in 
treataent incidence. These differentials by race were not apparent in either 
the gross treatsent rates by race <Table 1> or in the reduced-fora equations 
accounting for the incidence of treat1tents by race controlling only for 
socioeconoaic status. - Controlling for (endogenous> initial health status c:;an be 
i11portant for understanding how the health care systea allocates aedical 
treataents acro&s sc;cioecono:aic groups. 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper we have exaained how aedical traataents are distributed aaon9 
pregnant women according to both their initial health ~nd their econoaic 
resources under different iaplicit pricing regiaes- for allocating aedicol 
&ervicea. We showed that when the following three conditions hold--(i> aedical 
treataents and pre-trectaent health status are subatitutes in the sense that 
treat11ents ere aaeHorati-ve; <ii> pre-treatment health is influenced by agents' 
behavior: and (iii> trectMents are allocated in a •arket with unifora prices-­
then differences in health status prior to treatment will not only not account 
for disparities in treatment by inco:ae end education, but such disparities will 
be greeter within groups of identical pre-treatment health status then across 
such groups in the entire population. 
Based on a probability sc11ple of :acrried pregnant women havin9 c legitbate 
live birth in 1980 in the United States, we found that (i) more-educated woaen 
and woJaen with husbunds havlng higher incoaes receive a disproportionate share 
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of the four aaJor treataents studied. Cii) the prenatal treat~enta are aore 
likely to be provided to leas-healthy infant& CJRother•> within achooling and 
inco•e groups, and (iii) treataent differential& by education and incoae are 
increased by controlling for tho&e behav.iora that affect the pre-treataent 
healthiness of the infanta The result& thu& are consistent with the existence 
of a ~arket regiae for aedical care that allocate& health treatMent& to tho&e 
who demand thea. whether the deaand i& due to superior knowledge of the benefits 
of health, greater resources, or preferences. We thus could not find evidence 
that the tax subsidization of health care dominantly influences the allocation• 
· of these foras of 11\edica-l care, nor evidence that health-related subsidies 
targated to the poor hGva aliBinated income disparities in treat•ents. 
It is also shown that the healthiness of the aother and child. net of the 
·. influences of both p1·enatal input& and treat11ent&., may Jointly affect pre­
treataent parental decigion& and the use of subsequent treataents. We found 
that, as expected., xother& of healthier infant& were more likely to postpone 
seeing a doctor. visited the doctor less often, and were le&& likely to receive 
treat•e~ts while pregnant. This coMpensatory allocation of ~edical services, 
co11bined with the inability to measure directly all contributions to pre­
treatHent health that are observed by the decision-~aking agents <parents and 
doctors>. can lead to erroneous inferences concerning the efficacy of the 
treat~ents. This selection bias in the use of Medical care make& it appear. for 
e~aMple. that one pranatal procedure, amniocentesis, reduces birthweight while 
its use appears to actually increase birthweight when selection i& taken into 
account. Controlling for initial health status can therefore significantly 
change 11easures of the therapeutic benefits of •edically-adPinistered treat11ent& 
in the U.S. health care systea. 
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Finally, Black aothera were found to hcve lower birthweight infants.than do 
White& net of treataent& and their own pre-treataent health behavior. Despite 
this, they are aore likely to postpone visiting a doctor, and see a doctor le&& 
frequently._ And even wh~n pre~treataent behavior, schooling, and inco•e are 
taken into occount, Black •other& are no aore likely than White Mothers to 
receive x-ray& end are significantly le&& likely to receive either amniocentesis 
or ultrasound. Black aothers are Marginally Bore likely, howe~er, to receive a 
caesarian section with it& associated higher Mortality rate&. The allocation 
regi~e behind the distribution of ffiedical treataent& to pregnant women in the 
United States, which appear& to be consistent in several regards with a 
conventional narket r.egiae, i& also •arked by an unexplained tendency to serve 
the Black population le&& extensively than it does the White. 
29 
Re:£erencea 
Acton, Jan P., "'Non11onetary Factora in the Deaand for !ledical Services," 
Journal of Political Econo~y 83, May 1975, 595--614. 
Aday, L.A.; Fleaing, G. F. and Anderon, R., Access to Medical Care in the 
U.S.: Who Has it. Who Doesn't, Chicago: Pluribus Pres&, 1984. 
Becker, Gary S., ..A Theory of the Allocation of TiMe," Econo11ic Journal 75, 
Septeaber 1965, 493-517. 
Blandon, Robert J.; Aiken, Linda H.; Freeman, Howard E.; Kirkman-Liff, 
Bradford; and Murphy, John w., ••uncompensated Care by Hospitals or Public 
Insurance for the Poor, Does it l'lake a Difference?.. The New England Journal 
of Medicine, Kay 1, 1986, 1160-1165. 
·Colle, Anne D. and Grossman, Michael, ..DeterMinants of Pediatric Care Utili­
zc1:,ion, .. Journal of Human Resources 13, <Supp.>,, Spring 1978, 115-158. 
Cora~m, Hope end Gr,:,ssman, Michael, ..Dater11inant.r;:; of Neonate! Mortality 
Rates in the U.S., A Reduced For11 Hodel, .. Journal of Health Economics 4, 
1985, 215-236. 
Fuchs, Victor R., "TiDe Preference and Health: An Exploratory Study," in 
V. Fuchs (ed.), Economic Aspects of Health, National Bureau of Econoaic 
Research, Chicago: Chicago University Press. 1982, 93-120. 
Fuchs, Victor R., I.he Health Economy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1985. 
Goldaan, Fred and G·rossium, JHchael, ..The De11and for Pediatric Care: An 
Hedonic Approach," Journal of Political Economy 86, 1978, 259-80. 
Gros&nan, Hichael, ~'he Demand for Health: A Theoretical and Elllpirical 
Investigation, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, 
30 
Havtnum, Robert end Wolfe, Barbara, '"Education and Econoaic Woll-Being: 
The Role of Non Market Effects,'" Journal of Huaan Resources 19, Suaaer 
1984, 377-407. 
n~mning, Willia11 G.; Newhouse, Joseph P., and Ware, John E., Jr., '"The 
Status of Health in Deaand EGtiaation: or Beyond Excellent, Good, Fair and 
Poor," in V. Fuchs (ed.), Econo~ic Aspects of Health, National Bureau of 
Econofflic Research, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982. 
National Acadeffly of the Sciences, Coaaittee to Study the Prevention of Low 
Birthweight, Preventing Low Birthweight, Washington, D.C.: National 
AcadeMy Press, 1985. 
National Institute for Child Health and Develop11ent, Caesarean Childbirth, 
NIH Publication No. 82-2067, 1982 •. 
Newey. Whitney, "'Jfo:ximum Likelihood Specification Testin9 and Conditional 
ft0111ent Tests,"' Econometrica 53, Septe11ber 1985, 1047-1070. 
Pauly, Kerk V., "Taxation, Health Insurance, and-Market Failure in the 
Medical Econoay,"' Journal of Economic Literature 24, June 1986, 629-675. 
Rosenzweig, Hark R•• and Schultz, T. Paul, "'Esti•ating a Household 
Production Function:. Heterogeneity, the Demand for Health Inputs, and 
their Effects on Birthweight,°' Journal of Political Economy 91, October 
1983, 723-746. 
Saith, Richard J. and Blundell. Richard W., ""An Exogeneity Test for a 
5i~ultaneous Equation Tobit Hodel ~ith ~n Application to Labor Supply,• 
Econoaetrica 54, Kay 1986, 679-688. 
Taub~an, Paul and Rosen, Sherwin, "Healthiness, ~ducation, and Marital 
Status,"' in V. Fuchs (ed.), Economic Aspects of Health, National Bureau of 
Econo~ic Research, Chicago: Chicago University Prass, 1982, 121-40. 
31 
Tobin- Jo~es and Houthokker- Hendrik- "The Effects of Rationing on DeMand 
Elo&ticities- The Review of Economic Studies 18- <1950-51>. 140-153. 
32 
FOOTNOTES 
1. There have been a nu•bsr of prior iaportant econoaic and epideaiol09ical 
studies of the de~and for aedical care <e.g., Acton, 1975: Colle and 
Grossaan, 1978: Goldman and Gross•an, 1978: Ad~y, et al., 1982). These 
studies, however, a) are of populations heterogen·eous in health conditions, 
b> exaaine only visits to Medical personnel, not the distribution of 
services delivered by such personnel, and c> ..control"' for initial health 
conditions by eaploying subJective indicators of healthiness <excellent, 
good, fair, etc.> ascertained subsequent to the use of the Medical 
services. As nhown in Hanning et al. <1982), the use of these post­
treat•ent, subJective health •eaaures to take account of initial health 
· status leads to significant biases in the esti•ates of inco~e and/or 
&chooling effect& on 111edical care use. Eaplc,yaent of obJective indicators 
of health, even aeasured prior to treataent, as controls, however, would 
&till lead to inconsistent estbates, as we discuss below, since health and. 
u&o of aedical inputs may reflect the same underlying preferences or 
· biological propensities for healthiness. 
2. There is thus scope for the doctor to ..creatu" deMand by overstating the 
efficacy of treatfflents. Competition a~ong doctors presu~ably reduces this 
asymmetric infor~ation problem, but we focus on distributional rather than 
efficiency issues here. 
3. Inferences about the effects of health care pricing regimes based on the 
differential behavior of agents participating in different private health 
care plans are made difficult because agents' preferences for health and 
innate healthiness clearly influence the choice of Medical care insurance 
(adverse selection). Identification restrictions needed to ascertain the 
effects of the health plans are unclear. The RAND health insurance study 
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f' 
<Hanning et al.,1982> based on the randoaization of insurance scheaes 
provides soae iaportant insight& with respect to price-induced health 
behavior for the experiaental groups studied, but cannot provide 
inforaation about the actual distribution of aedical care across 
homogeneous groups in the United States associated with the current aedical 
care pricing£!:!!.. tax syste11. 
4. The two-€tage probit esti•ation procedure and tests for endogeneity are 
discussed in Newey (1985) and Saith and Blundell (1986). 
5. Note th~t we cannot use our esti•ates from Table 4 to coapute the 
distribution of treatMents under a regiMe in which only the efficacy of the 
treat~ents <pre-treatment health) aatters, ~sin a compulsory health 
· insurance regi~e, based on the pre-treat11ent- variable coefficients. This 
is because a change in the pricin9 of Medical services would induce a 
corresponding change in the distribution of pre-treatment health-related 
consu11ption goods (11oral hazard). 
6. While the ti11ing of.the first visit (delay) to a doctor or clinic by the 
Mother is a decision 11ade_principally by the 11other and represents c pre­
treati,.ent ••condition"' which the doctor 111ay need to taka into account, the 
nu~ber of prenatal visits reflects the treati,.ents provided and is thus 
influenced aG ~ell by the doctor. The numbsr of visits by the mother to 
the doctor is ~ot the~efore e111ployed as a •0asure of pre-treat~ent health 
status in esti.·•1atin9 the deter11immts of tn'.at11ent incidence net of pre­
treataent heal~h conditions. 
7. If education and income were 11erely proxies for pre-treat•ent health 
conditions not reflected in the other behavioral variables, they would be 
negatively correlated with the probability of receiving a treat111ent, if 
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health i& a nor~al good. Thi& i& because. a& &een in Table 3. treat~ent& 
are aore likely to be provided to le&&-healthy infant&/aother&. 
8. It is notable that in 1978 the •aternal aortality rate for cae&arean 
daliverie& was four ti~es that of vc9inal deliveries <National Institute of 
Child Health and Developnent. 1982>. 
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Appendix Table A 
Instrumental Variables, Data Sources and Sample Statistics 
Variable Def.illition 
lloclical Services: Available: Collllty 
Physicians per capita 1980 (x103) 
OB/GYN p~r capita 1975 (xl03) 
General Practitioner per capita 1975 
(x103) 
Hosp.ital family planning clinics per capita 
1980 cx1os> 
Uealth Dept. family planning clinics 
per capita 1980 (x105) 
Planned Parenthood clinics per capita 
1980 (x.105) 
Other family plauning clinics per capita 
(xlOS) 
Government Programs: County 
Expenditures per capita on Hospitals 1980 
Expenditures per capita on Education 1980 
Hospital beds per capita 1980 
AFDC maximum monthly benefits for family 
of four Ct) 
Food stamps bonn£ potential if only income 
is AFDC per family of four (t) 
Labor market: County 
Employment share in Agriculture 
Employment share in -Construction 
Employment share in Manu·factur ing 
Employment share in Transportation 
Employment share in Wholesale/Retail Trade 
Employment share in Financial Services 































































Bmploymen~ share in Business Services 
Employment share in Entertainment 
Employment share in Health Services 
Employment share in Public Administration 
Urban share of Population 
Unemployment Rate for Females in 1980 ('Ai) 
Unemployment Rate for Males in 1980 (~) 
Prices. Taxes. Regulations: State 
Alcohol state monopoly 
Tax on gallon of wine($) 
Cigarette price/pk. 1974 (t) 
Cigarette price/pk. 1979 Ce) 
Cigarette sales tax/carton 1974 Ct) 
Cigarette sales tax/carton 1979 Ce) 
Beer average Jan. and July price 1976 (6 pk) 
Beer average Jan. and July pric~ 1979 (6 pk) 
Liquor 8 brand average price 1976 (fifth) 
Liquor 8 brand average price 1979 (fifth) 
Ethnic and Racial Origin: Individual 
Mother race Asian 
Mother race Black 
Mother origin Iri~h 
Mother origin Puerto Rican 
Mother origin Cuban 
Mother origin Mex~can 









































































Father origin Irish J. NNS/MQ .233
( .423)
Father origin Puerto Rican NNS/MQ .00903
(. 0945)
Father origin Cuban NNS/MQ .00194
( .0440)
Father origin Mexican NNS/MQ .0418
( .200)
Child race Black NNS/BC .0818
(.274)
Mother origin all Hispanic countries NNS/.MQ .0713
(including other Spanish) ( .257) 
Personal Characteristics: Individual
Mother's education (years) NNS/MQ 12.7
(2.31)
Father's education (years) NNS/MQ 13.0
(2.53)
Father's in~ome (l/year) NNS/MQ 15.814.
(8817.)Father's height (inches) NNS/MQ 69.9
(6-. 31)
Father's weight (pounds) NNS/MQ 174c
(28.8) 
•sample weighted. with.births of less than 2500 granis given one fourth the weight,since they were selected four times as frequently as births greater or equal to 2500grams. 
Data sources codes:
Co-stat-1: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C •• County Statistics
file. 1984. 
AGI: Alan Guttmacher Institute IT0519, 1-2 July 1985. Personal
Corr:spon~ence Stanley Henshaw. 
Tobacco: The Tax Burden on Tobacco. The Tobacco Ins ti tu,te, Washington,D.c•• 1983. 
Ornstein: Stanley· I. Ornstein, UCLA. Personal correspondence, June
1985, and Professor Michael Grossman, NBER/CUNY Graduate
Center. 
Facts: 1980 Facts and Figures, The Tax Foundation, 1980. Table 200~ 
Urban: Toby Campbell and Marc Bendeck, A Public Assistance Data ~ook.
Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., October 1977. yExhibi t 31A,
p. lj5. 
NNS: Nati~nal Natality Survey 1980; MQ--Mother's Questionnaire;
BC--Dirth ~ertificate; Il--Hospital Questionnaire. 
